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The Wagner Model  
and International Freedom  
of Association Standards
Lance Compa
 * IntroductIon
I first met Pierre Verge just before beginning my service with the 
NAFTA labour commission in 1995. Not long after that, Pierre Verge 
and my own labour law professor at Yale in 1972, Clyde Summers, 
jointly wrote a penetrating evaluation of the first years of the NAFTA 
labour side accord, which still serves as the best single analysis of 
that seminal but flawed instrument linking labour standards and a 
trade agreement (Summers, Verge and Medina, 1998; Verge, 1999; 
Verge, 2002). Since then, my understanding of international labour 
standards and how they relate to labour law in North America has 
been shaped and enriched by Pierre Verge’s writing.
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In this essay, I want to examine a question implicit in some of Pierre 
Verge’s work: is the “Wagner model” that underpins both the U.S. 
and Canadian labour law systems consistent with international 
norms on freedom of association?1
Following this introduction, Section II provides a summary of rel-
evant international standards and creates a context for analyzing 
the Wagner model. Section III takes up key elements of the Wagner 
model and how they compare with international norms.
Section IV discusses how specific features of labour law and practice 
flowing from the Wagner model indeed run afoul of international 
standards, especially in the United States—not because of intrinsic 
flaws in the Wagner model, but because of legislative amendments 
and court decisions that undermine it. Section V offers a defense 
of the Wagner model and reasons not to replace it with a multiple/
minority representation system.
Here is my argument in brief:
Labour law and practice in the United States and Canada often 
violate international freedom of association standards. The Inter-
national Labour Organization’s Committee on Freedom of Asso-
ciation, an authoritative body that handles complaints against 
governments, has repeatedly found the United States and Canada 
in violation of the ILO’s FOA norms.2
1. See, among his prodigious output, Pierre Verge, “Réalité juridique du rap-
port du travail” in Gilles Trudeau, Guylaine Vallée and Diane Veilleux, 
Études en droit du travail à la mémoire de Claude d’Aoust, Cowansville, 
Yvon Blais, 1995; Pierre Verge and Guylaine Vallée, Un droit du travail? 
Essai sur la specificité du droit du travail, Cowansville, Yvon Blais, 1997; 
Pierre Verge, Configuration diversifiée de l’entreprise et droit du travail, 
Québec, Presses de l’Université Laval, 2003; Christian Brunelle and Pierre 
Verge, “L’inclusion de la liberté syndicale dans la liberté générale d’asso-
ciation: un pari constitutionnel perdu?” (2003) 82 Revue du Barreau 
canadien 712; Pierre Verge, “Inclusion du droit de grève dans la liberté 
générale et constitutionnelle d’association: justification et effets” (2009) 
50 Les Cahiers de Droit 267; Pierre Verge, “L’affirmation constitutionnelle 
de la liberté d’association: une nouvelle vie pour l’autonomie collective?” 
(2010) 51 Les Cahiers de Droit 353.
2. For discussion of such violations in the United States, see Lance Compa, 
Unfair Advantage: Workers’ Freedom of Association in the United States 
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Does this mean that the “Wagner model”3 that underpins both 
countries’ labour law systems is contrary to international stan-
dards? No. The essential elements of the Wagner model comport 
with ILO requirements. But lacunae in the original statutes, subse-
quent amendments, and interpretation of the law by labour boards 
and courts (especially in the United States; Canadian authorities 
have remained more faithful to Wagner principles) mean that many 
specific features flowing from the model indeed violate international 
standards. The challenge is to fix those features, not to ditch the 
Wagner model.4
 * 1.  InternatIonal standards
 * 1.1  Human Rights Instruments
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and related United 
Nations covenants, one on civil and political rights and one on 
economic and social rights, are a starting point for defining inter-
national norms. “Everyone has the right to form and join trade 
unions for the protection of his interests,” proclaimed the UDHR 
in 1948.5 The 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political 
under International Freedom of Association Standards, Ithaca, Cornell Uni-
versity Press, 2004; for violations in Canada, see Leo Panitch and Donald 
Swartz, From Consent to Coercion: The Assault on Trade Union Freedoms, 
Toronto, Garamond, 2003 and ILO decisions cited there.
3. The U.S. National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and Canada’s federal and 
provincial labour law systems flow from legislation introduced in the U.S. 
Congress by Senator Robert Wagner of New York State. It became known 
as the Wagner Act upon its adoption in the United States in 1935, and the 
“Wagner model,” which served as the foundation of Canadian federal and 
provincial labour laws beginning in the 1940s.
4. This essay focuses on the Wagner model as it relates to private-sector work-
places—not the many ways in which federal, provincial, state, municipal, 
and other public-sector jurisdictions in Canada and the United States have 
adopted and applied variations of the Wagner model, often in ways that 
clearly contradict international standards.
5. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217(III), UNGAOR, 
3d Sess, Supp No. 13, UN Doc A/810, (1948) 71, art 23.
Li Roux.indb   429 2014-11-17   13:08
430 Autonomie collective et droit du travail
Rights confirms that “Everyone shall have the right to freedom of 
association with others, including the right to form and join trade 
unions for the protection of his interests.” 6 Its counterpart covenant 
on economic and social rights confirms “the right of everyone to 
form trade unions and join the trade union of his choice… the right 
of trade unions to function freely… the right to strike […]”7
 * 1.2  ILO Jurisprudence
These international human rights instruments define workers’ 
freedom of association at a high level of generality—too general to 
construct clear legal standards. The International Labour Organiza-
tion’s Convention 87 on freedom of association and 98 on collective 
bargaining give them more shape and content. They call for:
  Free exercise of the right to form and join trade unions 
“without prior authorization” – meaning without needing 
government permission;
  Workers’ right to a trade union “of their own choosing”—not 
one chosen for them by the government or by the employer;
  Non-interference by the government or by employers with 
workers’ exercise of the right to freedom of association;
  Protection against acts of anti-union discrimination;
  Promotion of voluntary negotiation between workers and 
employers;
  The right to strike as an “intrinsic corollary” of freedom of 
association.
These are still not sharply defined rules. The ILO has two oversight 
bodies that interpret and apply the conventions: the Committee 
on Freedom of Association and the Committee of Experts on the 
6. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, December 19, 1966, 
999 UNTS 171, art 22.
7. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, December 
16, 1966, 993 UNTS 3, art 8.
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Application of Ratified Conventions. They have made thousands of 
decisions over many decades analyzing and giving specific content 
to freedom of association conventions.
Strict constructionists insist these are not “decisions” in the usual 
legal sense. They are rather findings, recommendations, comments, 
observations and other soft pronouncements, driven by political 
differences and policy considerations rather than legal principles 
(Langille, 2007; 2009).
Actually, political differences and policy preferences among con-
servative, liberal, and middle-of-the-road jurists drive decisions of 
the Canadian Supreme Court and the U.S. Supreme Court, too. But 
as courts they can issue binding decisions in national legal systems.
ILO committees can only issue decisions that are more or less 
authoritative, persuasive, compelling, convincing, etc. in the softer 
international law sphere. Still, in contrast to many Canadian and 
American court decisions in which judges meander along preferred 
policy pathways, ILO committee decisions are narrowly focused on 
the question presented, tightly constructed, closely reasoned, rhet-
orically temperate, doctrinally cautious, and otherwise models of 
judicious judicial analysis. They examine facts in light of norms and 
decide whether norms were breached—a classic judicial function.
Decisions of the two main ILO oversight committees are authori-
tative and persuasive for international labour law purposes, at least 
with respect to Conventions 87 and 98. Those two conventions 
impose “constitutional” and “customary” obligations on all member 
countries, whether or not they have ratified them. But without an 
authoritative interpretation of what the Conventions mean, non-rati-
fiers like the United States (for both Conventions) and Canada (for 
Convention 98), which have not transposed the content of the Con-
ventions into national law, would be off the hook for their inter-
national obligations.
Brian Langille objects that members of the Committee on Freedom 
of Association, unlike those of the CEARC, are selected as represent-
atives of the ILO’s three constituencies, governments, employers, and 
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trade unions, and they are not always lawyers. But there is a positive 
side, perhaps, in having actors with real-life experience, who may 
or may not be lawyers, playing a quasi-judicial role handling cases 
that come before them. In any event, both committees are served 
by top-quality ILO lawyers who ensure the legal soundness of the 
committees’ work.
Even for ratifying countries, decisions by both the CFA and the 
CEARC are needed for interpretation and application in the myriad 
concrete matters which these committees consider. Any well- 
functioning rule-of-law regime has to provide for a judicial system in 
which courts interpret the text of laws that cannot possibly anticipate 
every set of facts that might require their application. In the ILO, it 
is a quasi-judicial oversight system rather than “courts” as we know 
them in national systems, but its output is no less judicial.
Decisions by the ILO’s oversight committees provide authoritative 
interpretations of the conventions and indicate with a high degree 
of precision how they should be applied in practice. But they do not 
impose “one size fits all” standards on the ILO’s 185 member states. 
The committees clarify the rules, but allow the rules to take different 
forms in practice.
 * 1.3  Living with Ambiguity
The roots of labour law systems run deep in national territory, nour-
ished by each country’s labour relations culture and history of social 
struggles.8 The ILO has to be flexible and pragmatic, allowing for 
sometimes wide differences. So, for example, the CFA has left to 
the discretion of each country “in conformity with national prac-
tice and the industrial relations system in each country” whether 
and how to compel dues payments by represented workers who are 
not union members. In seeming contradiction, the Committee says 
8. This is axiomatic in comparative industrial relations scholarship; see, for 
example, Otto Kahn-Freud, “The Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law” 
(1974) 37 Modern Law Review 1 (himself hearkening back to Montesquieu’s 
Spirit of the Laws).
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“both situations where union security clauses are authorized and 
those where they are prohibited can be considered to be in con-
formity with ILO principles and standards on freedom of associ-
ation.” (International Labour Organization, 2006: para 365)
The United States and Canada diverge between and within them-
selves on this point, all within the framework of the Wagner Model. 
Some U.S. states (known as “union shop” states) permit unions and 
employers to negotiate compulsory dues payments by non-members. 
Other states (called “right to work” states) prohibit such agreements.
Dues obligations are separate from union membership. No one can 
be compelled to join a union in the United States or in Canada. 
However, if the employer agrees (and if such agreement is not pro-
hibited, as in “right-to-work” states), non-union members can still 
have to pay an amount equal to dues payments by union members. 
In the United States, non-members who make payments under such 
contract clauses can request and receive a rebate of the portion of 
their payments unrelated to collective representation.9
Some Canadian provinces require compulsory dues by application 
of the “Rand Formula,” a union security arrangement requiring all 
represented employees to pay union dues or “agency fees” equal to 
union dues if they are not union members (named after a Supreme 
Court justice, Ivan Rand, who ordered such an arrangement in 
a famous 1946 decision resolving a strike at Ford Motor Co. of 
Canada). Other provinces leave the matter to collective bargaining. 
No province prohibits an agreement on mandatory dues, as in U.S. 
“right to work” states.
I have often had trade union friends ask; “Can we bring a case to the 
ILO saying that right-to-work laws violate freedom of association?” 
And I suppose, without knowing, that the National Right-to-Work 
Committee might be asked: “Can we file a complaint with the ILO 
arguing that compulsory dues violate freedom of association?” The 
9. The rebate system is based on a U.S. Supreme Court decision in Communi-
cations Workers of American (CWA) v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988).
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answer in both cases is: You can bring a case, but you cannot win 
it, because the ILO leaves this question to national traditions and 
cultures.
 * 1.4  National Differences
I have had conversations with communist and socialist trade union-
ists in France who are firmly against compulsory dues, seeing them 
as an infringement of individual rights. For my part, I believe that 
right-to-work laws interfere with workers’ freedom of association, 
not per se but because of how they solidify the anti-union culture 
that gives rise to them in conservative states where employers dom-
inate the political power structure.
When I was a UE organizer in the 1970s, General Electric was an 
“open shop” company. The collective agreement did not contain a 
“union shop” clause requiring union membership and dues, even 
in states that allowed union shops. But at GE plants in Erie, Penn-
sylvania, in Schenectady, New York, in Lynn, Massachusetts, and at 
other big plants in traditional union strongholds, voluntary mem-
bership was 95 percent or higher.
Culture mattered, not the content of the law. The union was a force 
in the community. Young workers knew that the union made it a 
good place to work. Union stewards swiftly recruited newly hired 
employees.
In contrast, at the GE plant in Waynesboro, Virginia, the union 
won an NLRB election in 1969, just in time for a nationwide three-
month strike at General Electric. Virginia is a redoubt of Southern 
anti-unionism in the United States. “Union” is a dirty word in much 
public discourse, while “right to work” is gospel. About one-third 
of the GE Virginia workers were brave enough to stay on strike, 
avoiding a back-to-work debacle. But over the following years the 
union core remained at one-third, and never reached sustained 
majority status.
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 * 2.  the wagner model  
and InternatIonal standards
 * 2.1  Wagner Model Principles
As with the diametrically opposed law and practice on compulsory 
dues discussed above, the ILO Committee on Freedom of Associ-
ation has ruled that contrasting union representation and collective 
bargaining systems are compatible with the principles of freedom 
of association (International Labour Organization, 2006: para 950). 
In one case, one union with majority support in a defined “bar-
gaining unit” enjoys exclusive bargaining rights for all represented 
employees in the unit. In the other case, multiple unions can bargain 
for members with or without majority status among employees in 
the putative “unit.”
The Wagner model in the United States and Canada reflects the 
majority union-exclusive representation system, sometimes under 
the ungainly label “majoritarian exclusivity.” But this just captures 
two of its several core elements. The Wagner model embraces the 
following principles:
  freedom of association;
  protection of freedom of association;
  trade union independence;
  workers’ choice of union representative;
  workers’ ability to change or decertify unions;
  a defined “appropriate” bargaining unit;
  majority rule;
  “certification” by labour law authorities;
  exclusive representation;
  a duty to bargain;
  the right to strike for a new collective agreement.
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How do these core features of the Wagner model comport with 
international standards on workers’ freedom of association?
 * A. Freedom of Association
All workers in Canada and the United States enjoy freedom of asso-
ciation vis-à-vis the state. Workers can form unions, hold meetings, 
elect leaders, pay dues, hire staff, publish newsletters, build a website, 
host conferences, importune employers, petition the government, 
join rallies, marches, and other forms of protest, support candidates 
for public office, ally themselves with political parties, join national 
and international union federations, and otherwise act collectively 
to defend their interests. Government authorities cannot arrest, 
imprison, or take other action against workers or union leaders for 
such associational activity.
The Wagner Act and its Canadian counterparts reaffirm these basic 
rights. The Wagner Act declares, “Employees shall have the right to 
self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bar-
gain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and 
to engage in other concerted activities…” Canada’s federal labour 
code puts it even more pithily: “Every person is free to join a trade 
union of the person’s own choice and to participate in its lawful 
activities.”10
Federal, provincial, and state supreme courts in Canada and the 
United States have repeatedly recognized a “rights” foundation for 
workers’ freedom of association. As the U.S. Supreme Court said 
when employers challenged the constitutionality of the Wagner Act, 
“Employees have as clear a right to organize and select their repre-
sentatives for lawful purposes as the [employer] has to organize its 
business and select its own officers and agents.”11 Even the Labour 
Trilogy decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada, viewed at the 
10. Subsidiary questions whether workers have a constitutional basis for 
collective bargaining, strikes, boycotts, pickets, and other activities that 
implicate interests of employers, the community, and the public raise many 
complications, discussed below.
11. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
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time as anti-labour and later overturned in certain respects in 
B.C. Health, declared that “the Charter has reaffirmed the histor-
ical importance of freedom of association and guaranteed it as an 
independent right.” This is one positive element of the otherwise 
disturbing Trilogy that has not been called into question in later 
decisions.12
 * B. Protection of Freedom of Association
A key question is whether labour law protects the exercise of the right 
to freedom of association. Exercising the right without protection 
nullifies the right. The police might not arrest workers for union 
activity, but if employers can fire them with impunity, workers dare 
not organize. To guard against reprisals for associational activity, 
the state must protect employees by prohibiting such reprisals and 
providing a legal mechanism for recourse and remedy.
Under the Wagner model, U.S. and Canadian labour laws define 
and prohibit “unfair labour practices,” most notably 1) interference 
with union activity, 2) discrimination (such as dismissal) because of 
union activity, and 3) refusal to bargain with a certified trade union. 
They also create administrative tribunals that can act on claims 
and order remedies for violations, such as reinstatement and back 
pay for unlawfully dismissed employees, backed up by contempt of 
court power.13
U.S. law is even more favourable to workers than are ILO standards 
(and, on this point, more than Canadian law) because it protects 
any form of “concerted activity… for mutual aid and protection,” 
not just union activity. One worker who goes to her boss and says 
“I need a pay increase” can be fired; two workers who go together 
and say “we need a pay increase” are protected. If the boss fires them, 
12. Reference re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alberta) [1987] 1 S.C.R. 
313.
13. Exclusion of some categories of workers from protection of freedom of 
association is a glaring example of shortcomings in North American labour 
law, to be discussed below.
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they can file an unfair labour practice charge and win reinstatement 
and back pay.14
Workers need not have any intention of forming a union. They might 
even be ardently anti-union. It does not matter; they are “protected” 
under the Wagner Act.15 In other words, U.S. law protects not only 
the relatively small portion of the labour force represented by unions 
or seeking to form a union at any given moment, but also tens of 
millions of private-sector workers everywhere whenever two or more 
of them stick together to improve their working conditions.
The reach of this “concerted activity” protection is reflected in a 
new spate of social media cases in which workers discussed working 
conditions on Facebook or Twitter and their employers fired them. 
The National Labor Relations Board ordered reinstatement and 
back pay for victims because they engaged in protected concerted 
activity under the NLRA (distinguishing cases in which the Face-
book posting or Twitter comment was merely “individual griping” 
with no group aim or crossed bounds of decency).16
The importance of this concerted activity protection is also reflected 
in a recent NLRB decision that the Wagner Act overrides clauses in 
mandatory arbitration agreements in non-union workplaces that 
prohibit class actions by aggrieved employees. Many U.S. employers 
require workers unrepresented by unions to sign such mandatory 
arbitration clauses, waiving their right to bring an employment law-
suit to federal or state courts, as a condition of getting or keeping a 
14. I know that delays, weak remedies, difficulties in litigating mixed-motive 
discharges, and other problems plague the unfair labour practice system. 
But these problems are not inherent in the Wagner model.
15. It is not clear whether the same result can be inferred from CFA and 
CEARC decisions. Since only trade unions can file complaints to these 
ILO supervisory bodies (or employers or governments, but they would not 
normally have reason to file such complaints), the decisions only speak to 
workers’ trade union activity.
16. For an overall analysis, see NLRB Office of the General Counsel, Memo-
randum GC 12-05, May 2, 2012. The NLRB recently created a special 
website devoted to protected concerted activity in response to frenzied 
reactions among employers, workers’ organizations, and the media, at 
http://www.nlrb.gov/concerted-activity. 
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job. Such clauses typically prohibit any form of class action before 
an arbitrator.17 The NLRB ruled that class actions are a form of pro-
tected concerted activity. The employer community is in an uproar, 
furious that unorganized employees would enjoy such protection, 
and has challenged the Board’s decision in court (Dubé, 2012).
Social media cases have not yet come to the attention of the ILO 
oversight committees (just wait). But the NLRB’s decision to apply 
Section 7 protection to non-union workers in their use of social 
media is at least consonant with Convention 87 standards on 
freedom of association, and may even go above and beyond the 
convention.
 * C. Trade Union Independence
Unions in the United States and Canada jealously guard their status 
as workers’ organizations uncontrolled by government and uncon-
trolled by employers. Under the Wagner model, labour law in both 
countries prohibits employer formation or domination of trade 
unions. Section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act in the 
United States is severe in this regard. It effectively prohibits many 
forms of labour-management consultation and cooperation schemes 
as stalking horses for despised “company unions” meant to prevent 
genuine union formation.18
American and Canadian trade unions are close to friendly political 
parties—the Democrats in the United States, the New Democratic 
Party in Canada. But they are not organically attached, as hap-
pens in many other countries. And they are often critical, as in the 
U.S. presidential campaign when trade unions withheld millions 
of dollars normally provided to support the Democratic National 
17. D.R. Horton Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 184 (2012).
18. For comprehensive discussion, see Kenneth G Dau-Schmidt, “Employee 
Voice Symposium: Principal Paper: Promoting Employee Voice in the 
American Economy: A Call for Comprehensive Reform” (2011) 94 Mar-
quette Law Review. 765; Laura J Cooper, “Employee Voice Symposium: 
Responses and Critiques: Lessons from History: Letting the Puppets Speak: 
Employee Voice in the Legislative History of the Wagner Act” (2011) 94 
Marquette Law Review 837.
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Convention because party leaders chose to hold the convention in 
Charlotte, North Carolina, a right-to-work state where political elites 
are harshly anti-union and Charlotte itself is the epicentre of North 
Carolina anti-unionism (Mason, 2012: A10).
 * D. Choice of Representative
Within the framework of the Wagner model, workers can choose 
any union to represent them as a bargaining agent. In many coun-
tries, workers in certain companies or industries can only have the 
one union prescribed by law for that type of company or sector—
only one electronics union for electronics workers, only one apparel 
union for apparel workers, only one mine union for mineworkers, 
and so on, even if workers would rather have another union in which 
they have more confidence.
In Canada and the United States, the United Steelworkers can rep-
resent hospital staff, the Canadian or United Auto Workers can 
represent insurance company employees, the Teamsters can rep-
resent auto parts makers, predominantly public-sector unions can 
represent private-sector workers and vice versa, and so on in almost 
infinite permutation. In other words, workers can have the union “of 
their own choosing” which they feel will do the best job for them, 
not the union foisted on them by law.19
 * E. Changing or Decertifying Unions
The Wagner model precludes a phenomenon prevalent in many 
countries: monopoly unions that can never be displaced, no matter 
how ineffective they are or how overwhelmingly workers want to rid 
themselves of the union and get better representation. In the United 
States and Canada, unions may hold exclusive bargaining rights 
because at a certain point a majority of employees chose them. But 
workers are entitled to change their minds.
19. At my own university, the United Auto Workers represent hourly-paid 
maintenance workers, hotel workers, and food service workers, as well as 
the local municipal bus drivers.
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The Wagner model provides legal avenues to change union repre-
sentatives from one to another, or to decertify a union with which 
workers have become disenchanted. Not willy-nilly; to promote sta-
bility in labour relations, U.S. and Canadian labour law jurisdictions 
set up procedural requirements to decertify or displace unions. But 
the hurdles are not insurmountable for workers determined to get 
rid of an incumbent union. In 2007-2011, more than 1,300 NLRB 
decertification elections took place in the United States. Unions won 
562 of them to retain bargaining rights, but lost the rest.20
 * F. Bargaining Unit
A linchpin of the Wagner model is the concept of the “appropriate 
bargaining unit,” a group of employees in a workplace entitled to 
choose a representative and whose interests, under the standard legal 
test of “sufficient community of interest” for defining a bargaining 
unit, will be represented by the union.21 U.S. and Canadian labour 
laws empower labour law authorities to define such a bargaining unit 
of employees. Authorities look for enough community of interest 
among workers in a given workplace to be an effective bargaining 
group at a single negotiating table instead of many small, fragmented 
unions, each with special needs and demands, at multiple bargaining 
tables.
Employers and unions can agree on employees to be included in a 
bargaining unit, but they often disagree. Unions tend to prefer larger 
bargaining units (called “industrial” or “wall-to-wall” units) to 
enhance bargaining strength. Employers often resist them, arguing 
insufficient community of interest in the larger group of employees.
But this is not an iron rule. In the United States, roles are reversed 
in two key sectors: restaurants and retail stores. A recent NLRB 
decision favouring unions’ efforts to organize single establishments22 
20. See BNA Daily Labor Report, “NLRB Decertification Elections 2007-2011,” 
June 7, 2012.
21. “Appropriate” and “sufficient” are mostly undefined, so disputes and 
adjudications keep coming.
22. Specialty Healthcare & Rehabilitation Center, 357 N.L.R.B. No. 83 (2011).
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has provoked a furious legal and legislative response from national 
restaurant chains and national store chains, the latter led by Wal-
Mart (Dubé, 2012). They insist that only a nationwide bargaining 
unit of all their restaurants or stores is an appropriate unit. Because 
of the overwhelming logistical difficulty of organizing hundreds or 
thousands of establishments at one time, unions want an appropriate 
unit at the single restaurant or store where they can gain majority 
support.
Each side calculates the effect on majority status of including or 
excluding a subset of employees in a workplace and adjusts its 
position in light of the desired result. Unions might try to have a 
group in which anti-union sentiment prevails excluded from the 
bargaining unit, while employers might want to include them in 
an effort to prevent the union from gaining majority support. For 
example, many disputes involve the status of “group leaders” who 
would be in the bargaining unit if they are not considered super-
visors, but excluded if they are supervisors.
Majority status might hinge on whether such “group leaders” are 
included in the bargaining unit or not. In the end, labour law author-
ities resolve such disputes—the National Labor Relations Board in 
the United States (subject to appeals to federal courts), and federal 
and provincial labour boards and commissioners in Canada (with 
much more constricted right to judicial review).23
23. In the United States, bargaining unit determinations by the NLRB are not 
directly appealable to the courts. Instead, judicial review of bargaining unit 
determinations is triggered by a so-called “technical refusal to bargain” 
under the following scenario: 1) the employer and the union disagree on 
the composition of the bargaining unit (typically, a dispute revolves around 
employees whom one side or the other insists are “supervisors” who must 
be excluded from the bargaining unit, while the other side argues that 
they are really employees who lack supervisory status—note that either 
side might argue either position, depending on its strategic assessment of 
how the determination will affect majority status); 2) the NLRB decides the 
bargaining unit dispute in the union’s favour; 3) the union wins an NLRB 
election and the NLRB certifies the union as the bargaining representative 
for the unit, meaning the employer must come to the bargaining table and 
bargain in good faith with the union; 4) the employer refuses to bargain 
(the “technical refusal”); 5) the union files an unfair labour practice charge 
based on the employer’s refusal to bargain; 6) the NLRB automatically finds 
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 * G. Majority Rule
Under the Wagner model, U.S. and Canadian laws require unions to 
be chosen by a majority of employees in a bargaining unit (usually 
in a single workplace or in a single company) whereupon labour 
law authorities will “certify” the union. Labour law authorities only 
certify a union that demonstrates majority support in a defined 
bargaining unit.
A secret ballot election is often the means of confirming majority 
status, but in some circumstances unions can show majority support 
by signed membership cards, petitions, and other methods. Corres-
pondingly, labour law authorities will not certify minority unions.
This does not mean that minority unions cannot organize unions 
and seek to bargain with employers. It only means that workers 
without a majority cannot gain certification and the protections 
that accompany certification under the Wagner model. This is 
an important point in light of criticisms that the Wagner model’s 
“majoritarian exclusivity” violates ILO standards (Adams, 2008).
 * H. Certification
By certifying a union as the bargaining agent for workers in a bar-
gaining unit based on majority status, labour law authorities confer 
certain protections for the employees and their union. The union 
speaks for all employees in the bargaining unit. The employer must 
“recognize” the union and negotiate in good faith with the union. 
Refusal to bargain is an unfair labour practice.
The union’s representative status and bargaining rights are insulated 
for a certain period of time (usually one year) against challenge 
that the employer acted unlawfully, and orders the employer to bargain; 
7) now the employer appeals the unfair labour practice ruling to the federal 
court of appeals; and 8) the appeals court reviews the underlying dispute 
over the bargaining unit and whether the NLRB properly applied the “com-
munity of interest” standard, and decides whether to uphold the Board’s 
bargaining order or to relieve the employer of the bargaining obligation. 
All this takes years to unfold, frustrating employees’ freedom of association 
rights all the while.
Li Roux.indb   443 2014-11-17   13:08
444 Autonomie collective et droit du travail
by another union or a move by anti-union employees to decertify 
the union. This gives time to reach a collective agreement without 
the distracting fear of decertification or a “raid” by another union 
looking to poach its members.
In some Canadian jurisdictions, a certified union has recourse to 
mandatory arbitration to establish a first collective agreement if 
negotiations across the table are unsuccessful. U.S. trade unionists 
and congressional allies sought a similar “first-contract arbitration” 
provision in the proposed Employee Free Choice Act, a bill intro-
duced in 2009 when President Obama took office. However, the bill 
stalled in Congress and died when Republicans took control of the 
House of Representatives in the 2010 elections.24
 * I. Exclusive Representation
In the Wagner model, U.S. and Canadian laws make a certified 
union the exclusive representative of all employees in the bargaining 
unit, whether or not they are union members, whether or not they 
support the union, whether or not they would prefer to bargain indi-
vidually or in sub-groups for a better deal than they think the union 
will get them, and so on. A dissident minority is represented by the 
certified union, at least until they can convince their co-workers to 
create a new majority in favour of a different union or in favour of 
decertifying the union.
If 51% of employees choose union representation, and 49% are 
fiercely anti-union and want no part of it, too bad for them. The 
union is their bargaining agent, and their terms and conditions of 
employment are those negotiated by the union. Similarly, if the 49% 
are members and ardent supporters of a different union, too bad for 
them, too. The 51% union is their bargaining agent, and the 49% 
union cannot bargain on their behalf.
24. For discussion, see Sara Slinn and Richard W Hurd, “First Contract Arbi-
tration and the Employee Free Choice Act: Multi-Jurisdictional Evidence 
from Canada” (2011) 18 Advances in Industrial and Labor Relations 41.
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However, even where a majority-selected union holds exclusive 
bargaining rights, represented employees are free to form and join 
another union or unions without reprisal. Members of a minority 
union can organize among co-workers to have their union displace 
an incumbent union if they can gain majority support for their 
union. Under Section 9(a) of the NLRA, a minority union can also 
present grievances to the employer and have the grievances adjusted 
without the intervention of the certified union, as long as the results 
are not inconsistent with the collective bargaining agreement.
 * J. Duty to Bargain
When a union is certified, the coercive power of the state forces the 
employer, willing or unwilling (and in many cases unwilling, where 
an employer mightily resisted his employees’ organizing effort), to 
the bargaining table. The same coercive force requires him to bar-
gain with the union in good faith, defined (in NLRB and court deci-
sions, not in the statute) as having an open mind and sincere desire 
to reach an agreement. If an employer fails to meet this legal obli-
gation, the union can file an unfair labour practice charge alleging 
bad-faith bargaining.
“Open mind” and “sincere desire” are imprecise standards not easily 
capable of proof or disproof. This leads to complicated litigation in 
refusal-to-bargain unfair labour practice cases, where openness and 
sincerity must be inferred from the parties’ conduct. But these cases 
proceed and employers are often found guilty. The remedy is weak: 
usually an order to return to the bargaining table and try again, 
this time in good faith. But the employer is on notice, and one who 
adamantly refuses to bargain can be found in contempt of court and 
liable for large back pay liabilities.
At the same time the Wagner model does not require the employer 
to agree to any particular union proposal. The employer is entitled 
to engage in “hard bargaining” for proposals and counterproposals 
unpalatable to the union, as long as he does not engage in “sur-
face bargaining”—going through the motions of bargaining with a 
hidden goal of never reaching an agreement in order to get rid of the 
union when employees become frustrated and dissatisfied.
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Locating the line between hard bargaining and surface bargaining is 
just as challenging as the “open mind” and “sincere desire” problem. 
Still, labour law authorities will scrutinize bargaining conduct for 
evidence of surface bargaining and impose significant back pay 
remedies or other “make whole” measures upon finding violations.
On the face of it, this compulsory bargaining feature of the Wagner 
model goes beyond ILO Convention 98’s requirement that bar-
gaining be “voluntary” on both sides. It greatly strengthens unions’ 
hands. Indeed, U.S. or Canadian employers might well bring a com-
plaint to the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association, arguing 
that the Wagner model violates Convention 98 because it forces 
employers into involuntary negotiations.25
 * K. Right to Strike
ILO Conventions 87 and 98 do not expressly mention the right to 
strike. But the right has been carefully considered in many cases 
before the Committee on Freedom of Association and other super-
visory bodies for many decades, and is now firmly established in ILO 
jurisprudence as an essential element of freedom of association—“an 
intrinsic corollary of the right of association protected by Conven-
tion No. 87.”26
Consonant with ILO standards, union-represented American and 
Canadian workers in the private sector have a relatively unfettered 
right to strike for a first collective bargaining agreement in a pre-
viously non-union workplace, or when a prior contract expires and 
25. As far as I can tell, employers have never brought such a case. 
26. See International Labour Organization, Freedom of association and col-
lective bargaining: General survey of the reports on the Freedom of Associ-
ation and the Right to Organise Convention (No. 87), 1948, and the Right to 
Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention (No. 98), 1949, paragraph 
194 (1994). At the June 2012 International Labour Organization Confer-
ence, the employer group mounted a constitutional challenge to the ILO’s 
position on the right to strike, arguing that the subject is outside the com-
petence of the Committee of Experts. See “Employers’ Statement in the 
Committee on the Application of Standards of the International Labor 
Conference on 4 June 2012” (on file with author). The question remains 
unresolved as of this writing.
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workers seek improvements (or resist concessions) in a new contract. 
In each country, however, strikes while a collective agreement is in 
effect are severely constricted. Most collective bargaining agree-
ments in the United States contain a no-strike clause prohibiting 
a strike while the contract is in effect. Not all, however. Some con-
tracts do not prohibit strikes over grievances or strikes over selected 
subjects, such as health and safety, while the contract is in effect. In 
contrast, legislation and court rulings in Canada completely ban 
strikes while a collective agreement is in effect.
Unorganized American workers can strike, and their strike is 
treated as “protected concerted activities.” The employer cannot 
retaliate against them for striking.27 In a recent dramatic example, 
small groups of Wal-Mart workers around the United States staged 
work stoppages  protesting working conditions and treatment 
(Greenhouse, 2012: B2). Canadian workers are less protected: only 
union-represented employees can strike, and they cannot strike 
even if provoked by employer unfair labour practices, in contrast to 
American workers’ right to strike.28
Each country has erected further obstacles to workers’ right to strike, 
especially in the public sector, but these cannot be attributed to the 
Wagner model as such, which generally applies to private-sector 
employees. At its core, the right to strike for a new collective agree-
ment, whether for a first contract or upon expiration of a prior agree-
ment, is relatively free and protected.
27. The Supreme Court case confirming this protection is NLRB v. Washington 
Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962). The employer can replace them, as with 
any strike, but since strikes by non-union workers are often spontaneous 
and short, the employer is rarely in a position to replace them. He cannot 
replace them or otherwise take reprisals after they return to work.
28. Again, I leave aside public-sector strikes as too complex to weave into this 
essay. Legislatures in Canadian jurisdictions often enact back-to-work 
measures to end public employees’ strikes, and the ILO just as often finds 
them in violation of freedom of association standards. Most U.S. juris-
dictions prohibit strikes by public-sector employees—a clear violation of 
ILO standards, most recently found by the Committee on Freedom of 
Association in a case involving New York City transit workers. See ILO, 
Complaint Against the United States (Case No. 2741), Report of the Com-
mittee on Freedom of Association (2011).
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 * 3.  runnIng afoul: how the wagner model’s 
PerversIons vIolate Ilo norms
 * 3.1. Wagner Perversions
The argument here that the Wagner model comports with inter-
national freedom of association standards must be tempered by 
acknowledgment that many features of labour law and practice in 
the United States run afoul of ILO standards (I leave to Canadian 
colleagues a fuller discussion of shortcomings there). But it is not the 
Wagner model as such that contradicts ILO standards. It is rather 
the perverse application of the Wagner model created by the 1947 
Taft-Hartley amendments in the United States, which Canada was 
luckily spared, and by court decisions that inexorably moved labour 
law in a direction favourable to employers and contrary to inter-
national freedom of association norms.
The “exclusion” feature of U.S. and Canadian labour laws is a 
starting point. However, it did not start with the 1947 Taft-Hartley 
Act. The original Wagner Act notoriously excluded farmworkers 
from coverage, and thereby protection, of freedom of association 
under the Wagner Act.29 Vis-à-vis the state, they had freedom of 
association. Government authorities would not arrest farmworkers if 
they formed unions. But employers could fire them, and they had no 
recourse to a labour board or other means to obtain reinstatement 
and back pay.30
29. Most analysts attribute the exclusion of agricultural workers under the 
Wagner Act to political expediency because racist Democratic members 
of Congress from Southern states made it a condition of their votes for 
the NLRA, which were needed to secure passage. See Michael H LeRoy 
and Wallace Hendricks, “Should ‘Agricultural Laborers’ Continue to Be 
Excluded from the National Labor Relations Act?” (1999) 48 Emory Law 
Journal 489.
30. California and a handful of other states have enacted state-level agri-
cultural labour relations acts granting protection for organizing. In 
Canada, the Dunmore-to-Fraser line of cases has established protection 
for farmworkers’ organizing. So have decisions of some state courts in 
the United States. The Supreme Court of New Jersey, for example, ordered 
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The 1947 Taft-Hartley Act went much further. It stripped union 
rights from low-level supervisors and independent contractors, 
taking millions of employees out from even the possibility of col-
lective bargaining. It let states adopt “right to work” laws to under-
mine union strength. It outlawed worker solidarity moves under the 
rubric of “secondary boycotts.” It added an “employer free speech” 
clause permitting managers openly and aggressively to campaign 
against employees’ organizing efforts in the workplace.
Court decisions over many decades also took U.S. labour law in a 
direction harmful to workers and their unions. Well before 1947, 
the U.S. Supreme Court decided that employers can permanently 
replace workers who exercise the right to strike.31 In the 1980s it got 
worse. This was a time when union membership fell and prevailing 
values shifted away from industrial democracy and social solidarity 
toward management control and global competitiveness. Permanent 
replacements became widespread, signaled by Ronald Reagan’s mass 
firing of air traffic controllers who struck in 1981.32
Landmark labour law decisions in the 1980s and 1990s continued 
the anti-union trend. The U.S. Supreme Court decided that workers 
reinstatement and back pay for farmworkers fired for union organizing 
based on state constitutional guarantees of the right to organize and bar-
gain collectively. “Unless an employer’s unfair labor practices [the court 
borrowed this phrase from Wagner-style discourse; no law defined “unfair 
labor practices” in connection with farm labor] are effectively remedied, 
unions that represent migrant farm workers will be substantially weakened, 
if not decimated… [B]ackpay and reinstatement are appropriate remedies 
to enforce the constitutional guarantee of [the right to organize].” See 
COTA v. Molinelli Farms, 552 A. 2d 1003 (1989).
31. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938). The deci-
sion contained two provisos: 1) permanently replaced workers cannot be 
dismissed; they remain on a recall list if strikebreakers leave and create 
openings, and 2) employers cannot permanently replace workers who strike 
in response to an employer’s unfair labour practices.
32. See, for example, Jonathan D Rosenblum, Copper Crucible: How the 
Arizona Miners’ Strike of 1983 Recast Labor-Management Relations in 
America, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1998; on the air traffic control-
lers’ dispute, see Joseph P McCartin, Collision Course: Ronald Reagan, the 
Air Traffic Controllers, and the Strike that Changed America, New York, 
Oxford University Press, 2011.
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have no right to bargain over an employer’s decision to close their 
workplace because employers need ‘unencumbered’ power to make 
decisions speedily and in secret. The Court said that collective bar-
gaining “could afford a union a powerful tool for achieving delay, a 
power that might be used to thwart management’s intentions.”33 In 
another case, the Court found that workers have no right to receive 
information from trade union organizers in a publicly accessible 
shopping mall parking lot because the employer’s private property 
rights outweigh workers’ freedom of association.34
When NLRA policy supposedly came into conflict with immigra-
tion policy under the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), 
the Supreme Court declared IRCA the winner. Denying a back pay 
remedy for undocumented workers unlawfully fired for union 
organizing, the Court decided that immigration policy trumps pro-
tections for workers organizing and bargaining. Rather than viewing 
the NLRA as a guarantee of basic rights, the Court saw it as just 
another policy choice, one that must yield to immigration policy.35
 * 3.2  The United States before the CFA
The ILO Committee on Freedom of Association has found several 
of these aspects of U.S. labour law to be inconsistent with Conven-
tions 87 and 98. In a complaint brought by the AFL-CIO against 
the court-created striker replacement doctrine, the ILO Committee 
on Freedom of Association said that “[t]he right to strike is one of 
the essential means through which workers and their organisations 
may promote and defend their economic and social interests” and 
that American employers’ use of permanent replacements to break 
strikes violates this right (International Labour Organization, 1991: 
para 92).
33. See First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
34. See Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992).
35. See Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002).
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The United Food and Commercial Workers (UFCW) and the IUF 
Global Union filed a complaint to the CFA against restrictions under 
U.S. labour law on access to employees at any employer-owned prop-
erty, such as parking lots and other publicly accessible areas. The 
Committee concluded that union representatives must be granted 
an equal opportunity to inform workers about organizing, including 
through union representatives’ access to the workplace, so that 
workers may hear from them (International Labour Organization, 
1992).
In a case brought by the AFL-CIO and a Mexican union federation, 
the ILO committee on Freedom of Association concluded that “the 
remedial measures left to the NLRB in cases of illegal dismissals of 
undocumented workers are inadequate to ensure effective protec-
tion against acts of anti-union discrimination” and recommended 
legislative action to bring U.S. law “into conformity with freedom 
of association principles (International Labour Organization, 2003).
 * 4.  In defence of majorItarIan exclusIvIty
 * 4.1  Minority Union Rights
Let me focus on the charge that the Wagner model’s “majori-
tarian exclusivity” violates ILO norms on the rights of minority 
unions. Under the Wagner model (and here I limit myself to 
discussion of U.S. law, not confident that I can get the nuances 
of Canadian law right), workers have the right to form minority 
unions, both in a non-union workplace and in a workplace with 
a majority-certified union. They can exercise all rights of asso-
ciation and self-organization in connection with their minority 
unions, and they are fully protected by the unfair labour practice 
regime.
In a non-union workplace, minority unions can request, and 
employers can consent to, bargaining on behalf of their members. 
They cannot do so in workplaces with certified union representatives 
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(i.e., employees can request, and they cannot be punished for 
requesting, but the employer cannot consent).36 But even here, min-
ority unions have the right to present grievances on behalf of their 
members and to have their grievances resolved without the interven-
tion of the certified union (as long as the resolution is not contrary 
to the collective agreement).
These minority union rights are fully consistent with ILO norms, 
starting with convention 87’s insistence on workers’ right to form 
and join unions “of their own choosing.” The only thing that min-
ority unions cannot do—which certified majority unions can do—is 
to invoke the coercive power of the state to compel non-consenting 
employers to the bargaining table with a good faith bargaining obli-
gation. Indeed, as mentioned earlier, compulsory good faith bar-
gaining itself arguably violates convention 98’s principle of voluntary 
collective bargaining. It goes beyond the standard set out by the 
Committee on Freedom of Association when it said: “If the union 
is found to be the majority union, the authorities should take appro-
priate conciliatory measures to obtain the employer’s recognition of 
the union for collective bargaining purposes” (emphasis added, i.e., 
not coercive measures, as the Wagner model provides) (International 
Labour Organization, 2006: para 959).
When the law requires an unwilling employer not only to come to 
the bargaining table but also to “have a sincere desire” to reach a 
collective bargaining agreement, backed up by contempt-of-court 
power, collective bargaining is not voluntary. The employer did not 
want his employees to have a union, but now they do. He does not 
want to sit across the bargaining table from this union intruder who 
gulled a majority of his employees into voting for a union. He does 
not want to reward the union with a contract. But, under the law, 
he must bargain with a sincere desire to reach an agreement or he 
acts unlawfully.
36. But employees can be disciplined (including dismissed) by the employer 
if they persist in picketing and other steps to interfere with the employer’s 
business after the employer (properly) refuses to bargain with their min-
ority group and asks them to halt their picketing. See Emporium Capwell 
Co. v. Western Addition, 420 U.S. 50 (1975).
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 * 4.2  The Wagner Trade-Off
The Wagner model reflects a trade-off. It says: We will impose on 
employers an obligation (compulsory good faith bargaining) that is 
not required by ILO standards (requiring voluntary good faith bar-
gaining), but we impose on unions another obligation not required 
by ILO standards—to establish majority status—as a condition of 
compelling the employer to bargain.
This is the law in the United States and Canada under the Wagner 
model. It infringes the ILO requirement of voluntariness in col-
lective bargaining. It empowers certified unions to the detriment 
of minority groups. But this is the legal method by which North 
American jurisdictions have chosen to implement workers’ freedom 
of association and the right to collective bargaining based on history, 
tradition, culture, and social struggle in those societies.
The favour shown to certified unions under this regime does not 
mean that minority unions’ rights are violated under ILO stan-
dards. In the same way, the ILO allows national differences on 
majority/minority and exclusive/plural representation systems to 
play themselves out without finding one or the other inconsistent 
with freedom of association standards.
The ILO allows the Wagner model as a legitimate outcome of the tra-
jectory of labour relations in North America. An alternative model, 
equally tolerated by the ILO and prevalent in many countries, does 
not coerce employers into bargaining. Instead, it lets workers and 
unions strike to bring the employer to the bargaining table. Indeed, 
this was the situation in the United States and Canada in the pre-
Wagner era, but mass strikes and social movements won passage of 
the Wagner Act.
 * 4.3  The CFA and Minority Unions
Advocates of replacing majoritarian exclusivity with minoritarian 
pluralism often point to decisions of the ILO Committee on Freedom 
of Association that 1) “a provision [in the country’s labour law] that 
stipulates that a collective agreement may be negotiated only by a 
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trade union representing an absolute majority does not promote col-
lective bargaining” (i.e., voluntary collective bargaining, per C. 98) 
and 2) “when no trade union represents the absolute majority of 
the workers, the organizations may jointly negotiate a collective 
agreement applicable to the enterprise or the bargaining unit, or at 
least conclude a collective agreement on behalf of their members.” 
(International Labour Organization, 2006: para 978)
The first instance is not the Wagner model. The cases in question 
involved regimes in which only a majority union may reach a col-
lective bargaining agreement even if the employer is willing to reach 
an agreement with a minority union. Under the Wagner model, an 
employer may only be compelled to bargain when a union establishes 
majority status. But nothing prevents him from voluntarily reaching 
an agreement with a minority union as long as there is no majority 
union, in line with ILO norms in support of voluntary collective 
bargaining.
The second instance contemplates a multiple minority union scen-
ario, not a workplace where a minority forms a union (the only 
union—no other union is in sight) but fails to reach majority status. 
Even with multiple minority unions, the CFA says only that they 
“may” bargain, implying that bargaining would take place volun-
tarily, with an employer willing to bargain with them—not that the 
law should compel the employer to bargain involuntarily. In the 
United States and Canada, employers do not do it because no one 
can make them, and they prefer not to deal with unions unless 
someone makes them.
Approving the Wagner model is a paradigmatic application of the 
ILO’s flexibility and pragmatism. It takes into account U.S. and Can-
adian traditions, practices, and cultures of labour relations, recog-
nizing a trade-off between requiring the union to establish majority 
status and forcing the employer to the bargaining table. This is the 
social “bargain” struck in the legislation of each country.
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 * 4.4. Practical Problems
We cannot wrench a labour relations system from its historical 
moorings. The unity, strength, and solidarity needed to confront 
determined anti-union employers (that is, most employers in North 
America) would be fragmented and atomized in a minority rep-
resentation system. Here are some practical problems that would 
arise in moving the U.S. and Canadian systems from the Wagner 
model to minority/plural unionism:
 * A. Craft unionism
Only subgroups with bargaining strength based on critical skills 
that cannot easily be replaced in a strike might be able to gain 
from minority bargaining. Workers would lose the tide-lifting, 
wage-compressing effects of bargaining units encompassing many 
job classifications.
Craft union mentality is still alive and well in the American labour 
movement. Without the glue of exclusive representation, the tempta-
tion for highly-skilled groups to break off would often be irresistible. 
In fact, the NLRA has a “unit clarification” mechanism for craft 
groups to carve themselves away from an established bargaining 
unit.37 Thankfully, the threshold is high—the putative breakaway 
group would have to show that they are ignored by the bargaining 
agent.38 But another, probably more important reason that such 
breakaways are rare is that skilled workers are often union leaders 
with a degree of class consciousness and appreciation for holding 
their unit together, even at some personal sacrifice of what they 
might otherwise obtain through separate bargaining.
37. See NLRA Sec. 9(b)(2).
38. See, for example, Mallinckrodt Chem. Works, 162 NLRB 387 (1966).
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 * B. Raiding
Given the unfortunate history and still persistent pattern of inter-
union rivalries,39 multiple minority unionism would also provoke 
new rounds of fighting among unions for pieces of the workplace 
action. Believing that the proper role of a union is to make life more 
challenging for management (by forcing them to be better man-
agers, not labour exploiters), I do not sympathize too much with 
management concerns about unions being too demanding. But I 
do believe that it is better for management, too, to bargain with one 
authoritative representative speaking for all employees, not a bunch 
of splinter groups each looking for its own best deal.
 * C. Discrimination
Potential unlawful discrimination problems also loom. If a minority 
union group is strong and wins conditions superior to unrepresented 
workers, the latter have a viable claim for discrimination because 
of their non-union membership. If members of a weak minority 
union get stuck with inferior conditions, they have a viable claim 
for discrimination because of union membership.
This problem is even more acute if it involves a minority of workers 
in the same “bargaining unit” with similar skills and job require-
ments. No employer is going to give them better terms than their 
non-union counterparts. That just leaves employers open to charges 
of discrimination under the NLRA, or to claims under equal pay 
statutes, or—if it involves a minority based on race or ethnicity—
claims under anti-discrimination laws.
 * D. Company unions
Multiple unionism also would open the door to an abuse that afflicts 
labour movements in many countries: unions covertly sponsored 
39. Real recent examples in the United States include Teamsters vs. Machinists, 
Machinists vs. Autoworkers, Autoworkers vs. Steelworkers; Steelworkers vs. 
Flight Attendants (!); AFSCME vs. SEIU, SEIU vs. UNITE-HERE; UNITE 
HERE vs. UFCW; Carpenters vs. everyone else; and on and on.
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by employers to blunt the effectiveness of real unions. Employers 
do not always have to push hard, either. Many workplaces have 
employees who are management-minded, management-oriented, 
management-aspiring, or otherwise willing to counter a more mil-
itant, independent union. They are certainly entitled to their views. 
But in the Wagner model they have to pursue them by running for 
leadership positions within the union, making their case to union 
members for a less militant stance, rather than breaking away in a 
separate union submissive to management.
In fact, union moderates often prevail against union militants in 
leadership contests (Johnson, 2009: C22). And vice versa (Swo-
boda, 1999: E1). Internal debates and alternating leadership can be 
a healthy dynamic in a democratic union—a lot healthier than sep-
arate, moderate, and militant unions representing the same group 
of workers and spending more time fighting each other than con-
fronting management.
 * E. No unions
An even more malignant danger lurks in the way of minority 
unionism in the United States, again linked to our peculiar labour 
law history and culture. One cannot open the door to minority 
unionism without opening the door to no unionism—the ability of 
anti-union workers, of whom there are many, in any given work-
place, to abjure representation and go it alone with management in 
the hope of favourable treatment (which management in many cases 
will afford them, to “stick it to” the union).
A long-sought goal of the National Right-to-Work Committee, an 
employer-sponsored organization devoted to undermining trade 
unionism in the United States, is to smash the exclusive representa-
tion system by allowing individual workers to opt out of union rep-
resentation and bargain for themselves, in the name of individual 
freedom. The Right-to-Work Committee calls exclusive representa-
tion “monopoly bargaining […] a special coercive privilege given 
to unions by federal law […] every worker loses his or her right to 
negotiate directly with the employer on his or her own behalf […] 
trampling of individual rights […] coercion to herd workers into 
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collectives against their will […] enthrones union-boss control over 
workers […].”40
Anti-union congressmen in the House of Representatives have 
introduced legislation in line with the wishes of the Right-to-Work 
Committee that would abolish exclusive representation and let indi-
vidual workers make individual employment contracts that could 
be either better or worse than collectively-bargained terms.41 Under 
the proposed bills, highly-skilled employees could opt out of a bar-
gaining unit to seek higher pay than that negotiated by the union. 
Alternatively, unskilled workers could opt out of the bargaining unit 
and agree to lower pay in exchange for a no-layoff promise or some 
other perceived benefit. The result would be chaotic. Anyone who 
thinks this would not happen does not appreciate the individualistic, 
me-first, strain in American working class culture that is held at bay 
by the Wagner Act.
 * conclusIon
France, Italy, and Spain can live side-by-side with workers belonging 
to the Communist union, the Socialist union, the Christian union, 
the apolitical union, and so on. That arrangement grew organic-
ally from more than a century of social struggle in which left-wing 
parties and churches were key protagonists. Wrenching them into 
a Wagner model of majoritarian exclusivity would be as senseless 
as the reverse.
In the United States and Canada, instead of communist, socialist, 
and faith-based unions, multiple minority unions would likely 
devolve into craft unions, Anglo unions, Latino unions, immi-
grants’ unions, French-speaking unions, English-speaking unions, 
40. See National Right to Work committee, “The Problem of Compulsory 
Unionism,” at http://www.nrtwc.org/about-2/the-problem/ (visited 
October 11, 2012).
41. For a description and discussion, see Charles W. Baird, “Unchaining the 
Workers,” Cato Institute Briefing Paper (2001), at www.cato.org/pubs/
regulation/regv24n3/brieflynoted.pdf (visited October 11, 2012).
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and unions based on other fault lines in the working class of both 
countries. And, at least in the United States, a significant “no union” 
option. Majoritarian exclusivity makes unions confront and over-
come internal divisions to forge unity in support of union goals.42
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